演讲题目：Incentive-Compatibility in Financial Contracting with Limited Liability
演讲嘉宾：Xiaojian Zhao（Assistant professor of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology）
In the presence of limited liability, the incentive compatibility constraints in ﬁnancial contracting models with asymmetric information are weaker than assumed in much of the literature. In this paper, we identify the problem that has been overlooked in the literature and provide a rigorous proof of optimality of debt contracts under fairly general assumptions.
Contracts: Theory and Practice
内容摘要： In this talk, the speaker will briefly introduce contract theory in the history of economic thought, the key ideas and applications of moral hazard models and incomplete contracting theory in relation to the real-life practice.
嘉宾简介：After receiving his PhD in economics at University of Mannheim, Prof Xiaojian Zhao has been an Assistant Professor of Economics at the HKUST since July 2010. His research focuses on contract theory, applied microeconomics and economics and psychology. Prof. Zhao’s contributions in contract theory have been published numerous journals including Review of Economic Studies, one of the top five journals in economics.