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(4-13PM3:00)第475期岭南学术论坛(经济学系列Seminar)

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报告题目:Labor market immobility and incentive contract design 

报 告 人:Nan Yang  (香港理工大学 助理教授)

主 持 人:Xi Wu(中山大学岭南学院 助理教授)

时      间:2018年4月13日(周五)下午 15:00-16:30

地      点:岭南堂黄炳礼会议室

语      言:英文+中文

 

Abstract:

This paper studies the effects of heightened labor market immobility on executive incentive contract design.  We exploit the staggered adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by U.S. state courts as an exogenous negative shock to top executives' labor market mobility, and we present three main findings. First, adoption of the IDD causes firms to lengthen incentive horizons by granting their managers option grants with long-term vesting schedules. Second, these new option grants are more likely to allow for early exercisability that is contingent on firm performance in a progressive manner (progressive performance vesting). Third, we also find that affected firms increase the convexity of option holdings by their managers, which are partly attributable to new option grants. Our paper collectively provides casual evidence that firms re-contract with their managers when they face adverse incentive from greater labor market frictions. Our results are consistent with the dynamic benefits and costs of providing risk-taking incentives via greater incentive horizons.

 

报告人简介:

       Yang Nan 现为香港理工大学会计与金融学院助理教授,研究方向是管理层薪酬激励、金融机构、信贷风险以及风险管理等。杨教授于2015年获得美国德州农工大学金融学博士。详细介绍请参见:/UploadFiles/xsbg/2018/4/201804091513384631.pdf

 

 

 

        欢迎感兴趣的年轻老师和博士生参加!

        中山大学岭南学术论坛分经济、金融和管理三个系列,是定期邀请国内外优秀学者前来开展学术交流的平台。每系列每个月定期举办2-3次。目前已经成功举办多期,并得到了各界的高度评价。

        论坛主页:http://lingnan.sysu.edu.cn/seminar/

 

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